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Wednesday, 09 December 2009

Question 200 - On Condign and Congruent Merit
Dear Dr. Sungenis,
I was reading both your book Not By Faith Alone and a response that you wrote on your web site to Michael Horton. In both your book and your web article you criticize both Horton and R.C. Sproul for stating that condign merit is the same as strict merit and thus imposes a legal obligation. You make a distinction between condign merit and strict merit, equating condign merit with congruent merit. I must confess that I am both confused by the concept of merit in this sense (this is not my question, I will read more and hopefully understand better afterwards) and am confused by the varied use of these terms (my real reason for writing). I have included 2 catholic web pages that discuss merit and which give a view different than what I understand you to be saying. Could you clear this up for me? Is the problem that various people (even learned theologians) are using different terms for the same concepts or am I reading something wrong here?
Thanks,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10202b.htm
Ethics and theology clearly distinguish two kinds of merit:
- Condign merit or merit in the strict sense of the word (meritum adœquatum sive de condigno), and
- congruous or quasi-merit (meritum inadœquatum sive de congruo).
Condign merit supposes an equality between service and return; it is measured by commutative justice (justitia commutativa), and thus gives a real claim to a reward. Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the lack of intrinsic proportion between the service and the recompense, claims a reward only on the ground of equity.
http://home.comcast.net/~icuweb/c01612.htm
“To understand merit, then, one must understand exactly which is meant by the term in theology because it is an analogous term. Merit is a kind of reward and normally it means something given in strict equivalence to someone for something he has done according to the virtue of justice. A contractor builds a house and merits a certain payment based on the contract and the work performed. If the one who contracted the work does not pay, then he is guilty of injustice. This is called condign merit, which is merit in strict equality. This is the normal experience of human reward in human affairs.”
Jim and Kay Panaggio
R. Sungenis: Jim and Kay, the answer is already in the Catholic encyclopedia article you cited above at New Advent. Let me reproduce it here and make a couple of comments to clear up your confusion. First, however, allow me to quote from Thomas Aquinas on this very issue. You can find this on page 628 of my book Not By Faith Alone:

Note the difference between meritum de condigno and that which is said to be merit in strict justice. Even though both bespeak some right to a reward, they do so in different ways. Merit in strict justice implies an absolute equality without any grace given to the person who merits. But merit de condigno involves an equality which arises from grace which has been given to the one meriting. (Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 114, a. 1, ad 3.)

Notice that Thomas is making a distinction between condign merit and merit in strict justice.

Now the article in the Catholic Encyclopedia

If, however, salutary acts can in virtue of the Divine justice give the right to an eternal reward, this is possible only because they themselves have their root in gratuitous grace, and consequently are of their very nature dependent ultimately on grace, as the Council of Trent emphatically declares (Sess. VI, cap. xvi, in Denzinger, 10th ed., Freiburg, 1908, n. 810): "the Lord . . . whose bounty towards all men is so great, that He will have the things, which are His own gifts, be their merits."

R. Sungenis: Notice that if one says he has a "right to an eternal reward" it is not a right in the strict sense, that is, as if God owes him the eternal reward because God is obligated to pay by contract, rather, it is "dependent ultimately on grace."

The Encyclopedia goes on:
Ethics and theology clearly distinguish two kinds of merit:
- Condign merit or merit in the strict sense of the word (meritum adœquatum sive de condigno), and
- congruous or quasi-merit (meritum inadœquatum sive de congruo).
R. Sungenis: This is not to be understood as if there are only two kinds of merit, but understood as being only two kinds of merit in "theology," that is, in Catholic doctrine. Catholic doctrine does not teach that we can receive anything from God by STRICT merit, and thus it is not a "theological" category.
The Encyclopedia continues:
Condign merit supposes an equality between service and return; it is measured by commutative justice (justitia commutativa), and thus gives a real claim to a reward. Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the lack of intrinsic proportion between the service and the recompense, claims a reward only on the ground of equity. This early-scholastic distinction and terminology, which is already recognized in concept and substance by the Fathers of the Church in their controversies with the Pelagians and Semipelagians, were again emphasized by Johann Eck, the famous adversary of Martin Luther (cf. Greying, "Joh. Eck als junger Gelehrter," Münster, 1906, pp. 153 sqq.). The essential difference between meritum de condigno and meritum de congruo is based on the fact that, besides those works which claim a remuneration under pain of violating strict justice (as in contracts between employer and employee, in buying and selling, etc.), there are also other meritorious works which at most are entitled to reward or honour for reasons of equity (ex œquitate) or mere distributive justice (ex iustitia distributiva), as in the case of gratuities and military decorations.
From an ethical point of view the difference practically amounts to this that, if the reward due to condign merit be withheld, there is a violation of right and justice and the consequent obligation in conscience to make restitution, while, in the case of congruous merit, to withhold the reward involves no violation of right and no obligation to restore, it being merely an offence against what is fitting or a matter of personal discrimination (acceptio personarum). Hence the reward of congruous merit always depends in great measure on the kindness and liberality of the giver, though not purely and simply on his good will.
R. Sungenis: So we see again that the encyclopedia makes the distinction between "strict justice" and "meritum de condigno." It understands the former as analogous to "contracts between employer and employee, in buying and selling," which is the same analogy St. Paul used in Romans 4:4 when he spoke about work being a matter of debt.
Still, condign merit does have some kind of claim attached to it, but it is a claim that can only be based on God's promise to reward not on a contract that binds God to pay the worker. I can claim, for example, that I have a right to heaven, but I make the claim only on the fact that God promised to give me heaven if I do what he requires. I cannot make the claim, however, by demanding that God pay me by contract, a contract devoid of God's personal promise but is only a legal agreement. Promise and law are two different things, as Paul argues in Romans 4:13.
I hope that helps.
Question 199 - Question about charges of Plagiarism

I know you are very busy. I hope to get through to you via this email. A friend posed this site against you in re to the accusation of plagerism etc. Can you direct me to a page off your site to answer these falsehoods? I've searched your site and could not find it.

thanks

Chuck

R. Sungenis: Chuck, thank you for bringing this to my attention. As for the charge of plagiarism, it is ludicrous. The guy who originally levied the charge has since apostasized and joined the Seventh Day Adventist church. His name is William Cork. His wife is Jewish and he saw me as a threat to the Jews when I was only trying to point out their errors so as to protect Catholics from their deception. So he organized a massive campaign against me beginning in 2002. In one of my essays on the Reflections on Covenant and Missions document that issued by Cardinal Keeler and Jewish rabbis in 2002, I had included some cutting and pasting from various articles about the Jews, the Talmud, Judaism, etc., that I saw on the Internet. I was then accused of plagiarism for this cutting and pasting. It was not plagiarism. Plagiarism is the unlawful stealing of the original work of the author, a work that the author did not get from other sources. The material I cut and pasted was already known and documented by many sources, and the source from which I took it had already admitted to getting it from other sources. Furthermore, I had never been accused of plagiarism either before or after Cork's charges, and all one need do is read my books to see that I have the most meticulous footnotes of any Catholic author on the market. Every fact I obtain from another source is religiously footnoted. So there simply is no paper trail for them to substantiate their charges.

In the bigger picture, you have to understand that these guys were seeking to destroy me for my outspokenness about the Jews. They wanted me off the Catholic map. They wanted to make it look like I was dishonest and that my scholarship couldn't be trusted, since it was attacking the Jews. I was one of the premier Catholic apologist before 2002, having had many shows on EWTN, having written two of the most popular Catholic books (Not By Faith Alone and Not By Scripture Alone), and having debated many Protestants and actually winning the debates. That all changed when I took on the Jewish issues, and the Geocentrism issues. I became a pariah. But I am in this game for the truth, not popularity. It has paid off in many ways. This past year the bishops of the United States voted to take out a heretical sentence from the 2006 United States Catholic Catechism for Adults. Page 131 had stated that the Mosiac covenant was still valid for the Jews. I was the only Catholic in the world to point out this error. I wrote to the Vatican and the US bishops two years prior. Finally, in June 2008, the bishops voted 231 to 14 to eliminate the sentence. This shows you what seeking only for truth will do. But it also shows me that no other Catholic apologist was willing to stick his neck out on this and many similar issues, mainly because they all fear reprisal from the Jews and their supporters. I am different than they are, and I have been viciously attacked because of it. But I am the one getting the results.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

God be with you both.

Robert Sungenis
Question 198 – Extra-terrestrial life and the Bible

To my knowledge the Bible says nothing of extraterrestrial life, but is the possibility left open by the Bible and Church teachings?

R. Sungenis: The Bible doesn't leave open the possibility for extraterrestrial life anymore than it leaves open the possibility that there is green cheese on the moon. Arguments from silence cannot be used as "possibilities left open." The only way the "possibility" of life on other planets was "left open" by the Bible is if the Bible already spoke of other planets having the possibility of sustaining life, which it does not.

Moreover, the Church has made a statement on this matter. Pius II, in the Bull Exsecrabilis, includes this statement negating life on other planets: "The proposition is condemned that: 'That God created another world than this one, and that in its time many other men and women existed and that consequently Adam was not the first man.'” Pius II, 1458-1464: Appeal to the General Council, From the Bull, Exsecrabilis, January 18; (Denzinger 717c).
Question 197 – Death penalty

I know the Church doesn't sanction the death penalty except in cases where the subject can't be contained resonably and situations like that are rare, but I don't believe the situations are rare. I believe that every murderer, rapists, serial killers, and other such criminals all have the capability to escape from prison, and if they did they would continue to murder... ect. So wouldn't it make sence to get rid of criminals like this that are a significant danger to society because if they escape they would only cause more damage. Instead of leaving open the chance of many more lives being destroyed, no matter how small the chance, why doesn't the Church sanction killing them so there is a 0% chance of more damage being done? Is there anything wrong with that view?

R. Sungenis: Convicts are imprisoned on the basis that they will not escape, not on the possibility than could escape. As such, escape cannot be a criterion for whether someone gets the death penalty. Percentage wise, escapes from prison are very rare.
Question 196 – What about bombing abortion clinics?

Question 196 – What about bombing abortion clinics?

I was curious about whether or not bombing an abortion facility would be morally justified because the lives of those babies saved would be more than the lives lost, and the lives lost are nothing more than sick twisted murderers that are a danger to society and talk people into killing their babies. Abortion providers should by law get the death penalty for murder anyway.

R. Sungenis: Bombing an abortion facility is not lawful under God or man. We must work through the law God has established (Romans 13:1-7). If we sanctioned bombing of abortion facilities, then we could sanction the bombing of porn shops, gambling casinos, gay bath houses, and even apartment buildings where we know sexual escapades are occurring. In fact, we could bomb any facility that we think is housing some kind of heinous sin.