December 9, 2009
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Question 200 - On Condign and Congruent Merit
Dear Dr. Sungenis,
I was reading both your book Not By Faith Alone and a response that you wrote on your web site to Michael Horton. In both your book and your web article you criticize both Horton and R.C. Sproul for stating that condign merit is the same as strict merit and thus imposes a legal obligation. You make a distinction between condign merit and strict merit, equating condign merit with congruent merit. I must confess that I am both confused by the concept of merit in this sense (this is not my question, I will read more and hopefully understand better afterwards) and am confused by the varied use of these terms (my real reason for writing). I have included 2 catholic web pages that discuss merit and which give a view different than what I understand you to be saying. Could you clear this up for me? Is the problem that various people (even learned theologians) are using different terms for the same concepts or am I reading something wrong here?
Thanks,
http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/10202b.htm Ethics and theology clearly distinguish two kinds of merit:
- Condign merit or merit in the strict sense of the word (meritum adœquatum sive de condigno), and
- congruous or quasi-merit (meritum inadœquatum sive de congruo).
Condign merit supposes an equality between service and return; it is measured by commutative justice (justitia commutativa), and thus gives a real claim to a reward. Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the lack of intrinsic proportion between the service and the recompense, claims a reward only on the ground of equity.
http://home.comcast.net/~
icuweb/c01612.htm “To understand merit, then, one must understand exactly which is meant by the term in theology because it is an analogous term. Merit is a kind of reward and normally it means something given in strict equivalence to someone for something he has done according to the virtue of justice. A contractor builds a house and merits a certain payment based on the contract and the work performed. If the one who contracted the work does not pay, then he is guilty of injustice. This is called condign merit, which is merit in strict equality. This is the normal experience of human reward in human affairs.”
Jim and Kay Panaggio
R. Sungenis: Jim and Kay, the answer is already in the Catholic encyclopedia article you cited above at New Advent. Let me reproduce it here and make a couple of comments to clear up your confusion. First, however, allow me to quote from Thomas Aquinas on this very issue. You can find this on page 628 of my book Not By Faith Alone:
Note the difference between meritum de condigno and that which is said to be merit in strict justice. Even though both bespeak some right to a reward, they do so in different ways. Merit in strict justice implies an absolute equality without any grace given to the person who merits. But merit de condigno involves an equality which arises from grace which has been given to the one meriting. (Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 114, a. 1, ad 3.)
Notice that Thomas is making a distinction between condign merit and merit in strict justice.
Now the article in the Catholic Encyclopedia
If, however, salutary acts can in virtue of the Divine justice give the right to an eternal reward, this is possible only because they themselves have their root in gratuitous grace, and consequently are of their very nature dependent ultimately on grace, as the Council of Trent emphatically declares (Sess. VI, cap. xvi, in Denzinger, 10th ed., Freiburg, 1908, n. 810): "the Lord . . . whose bounty towards all men is so great, that He will have the things, which are His own gifts, be their merits."
R. Sungenis: Notice that if one says he has a "right to an eternal reward" it is not a right in the strict sense, that is, as if God owes him the eternal reward because God is obligated to pay by contract, rather, it is "dependent ultimately on grace."
The Encyclopedia goes on:
Ethics and theology clearly distinguish two kinds of merit:
- Condign merit or merit in the strict sense of the word (meritum adœquatum sive de condigno), and
- congruous or quasi-merit (meritum inadœquatum sive de congruo).
R. Sungenis: This is not to be understood as if there are only two kinds of merit, but understood as being only two kinds of merit in "theology," that is, in Catholic doctrine. Catholic doctrine does not teach that we can receive anything from God by STRICT merit, and thus it is not a "theological" category.
The Encyclopedia continues:
Condign merit supposes an equality between service and return; it is measured by commutative justice (justitia commutativa), and thus gives a real claim to a reward. Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the lack of intrinsic proportion between the service and the recompense, claims a reward only on the ground of equity. This early-scholastic distinction and terminology, which is already recognized in concept and substance by the Fathers of the Church in their controversies with the Pelagians and Semipelagians, were again emphasized by Johann Eck, the famous adversary of Martin Luther (cf. Greying, "Joh. Eck als junger Gelehrter," Münster, 1906, pp. 153 sqq.). The essential difference between meritum de condigno and meritum de congruo is based on the fact that, besides those works which claim a remuneration under pain of violating strict justice (as in contracts between employer and employee, in buying and selling, etc.), there are also other meritorious works which at most are entitled to reward or honour for reasons of equity (ex œquitate) or mere distributive justice (ex iustitia distributiva), as in the case of gratuities and military decorations.
From an ethical point of view the difference practically amounts to this that, if the reward due to condign merit be withheld, there is a violation of right and justice and the consequent obligation in conscience to make restitution, while, in the case of congruous merit, to withhold the reward involves no violation of right and no obligation to restore, it being merely an offence against what is fitting or a matter of personal discrimination (acceptio personarum). Hence the reward of congruous merit always depends in great measure on the kindness and liberality of the giver, though not purely and simply on his good will.
R. Sungenis: So we see again that the encyclopedia makes the distinction between "strict justice" and "meritum de condigno." It understands the former as analogous to "contracts between employer and employee, in buying and selling," which is the same analogy St. Paul used in Romans 4:4 when he spoke about work being a matter of debt.
Still, condign merit does have some kind of claim attached to it, but it is a claim that can only be based on God's promise to reward not on a contract that binds God to pay the worker. I can claim, for example, that I have a right to heaven, but I make the claim only on the fact that God promised to give me heaven if I do what he requires. I cannot make the claim, however, by demanding that God pay me by contract, a contract devoid of God's personal promise but is only a legal agreement. Promise and law are two different things, as Paul argues in Romans 4:13.
I hope that helps.
