Robert,
I have struggled with trying to believe in geocentrism, but can't
reconcile it with what I've learned in school.  One of the biggest
problems I have is if everything is rotating around the earth even an
object such as Neptune would have to be traveling faster that the speed
of light to rotate around the earth in 24 hrs.  Not to mention the same
principle applied to much further objects.  How would you explain this?
Are they closer than science tells us they are?
Also didn't the rotation of the earth around the sun have to enter in
to the calculations for such a mission as Voyager which explored
Jupiter, Neptune, Uranus, etc?

Chesley

R. Sungenis: Chesley, let me answer the second question first. For the first question, I will give you an excerpt from my book Galileo Was Wrong: The Church Was Right.

Regarding sending out rockets, probes, satellites, etc., it makes no difference whether you use an Earth-centered system or a Sun-centered system. In fact, NASA uses both, and, in fact, they use the Earth-centered system to correct the Sun-centered system. The reason both can be used is that the distances, dimensions, and changes in distance between the sun, earth and the planets does not change from one system to the other. We show this on our CDROM animation that you get when you purchase the books.

Here is the excerpt from our book that deals with this issues:

NASA Use the Heliocentric System

for its Probes and Satellites?

In reality, NASA will use whatever system is more convenient, the heliocentric or the geocentric, since NASA’s orbital mechanics know that both models are equivalent, mathematically and geometrically. If they are sending probes near the sun, they will probably use a heliocentric model, since it is easier to make calculations when one considers the sun as fixed in space with the planets moving around it. If they are sending up satellites near the Earth, however, they will use a geocentric model, or what is known in the industry as a “fixed-Earth coordinate system.” This is because it is much easier to calculate and chart the movements of satellites circling the Earth if the Earth is understood as stationary in space. This fact is easily proven from the space agency’s own documentation. For example, in a letter written to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) making the following inquiry: “Is the present movement of GOES [Geostationary Satellite] planned and executed on the basis of a fixed earth or a rotating earth?” the answer returned by the department head of GOES/POLAR Navigation, Office of Satellite Operations at the NOAA was very simple: “Fixed earth.”[1]

At other times, NASA tries to give the impression to a gullible public that only the heliocentric model will work. Through email correspondence in October 2005, NASA representatives personally invited this author to their on-line Question and Answer forum.[2] A few weeks prior to the invitation, the same NASA representatives had answered a question on their forum from another person regarding whether NASA’s probes could be sent into space and tracked using the geocentric system rather than the heliocentric. The NASA representatives answered in the negative, stating: “If the universe were geocentric, all of our calculations for space probe trajectories would be wrong.” The person who asked the question then sent NASA’s answer to this author as proof for the heliocentric system. Accepting NASA’s invitation, I then sent a formal question to the NASA website asking them to show proof why a geocentric system would not work. After six weeks of not receiving an answer, I contacted the representatives by private email and asked if they were planning to answer the question. They wrote back to me and stated that they did not plan to answer it. After I tried to convince them that, since in this public forum they had, by their initial assertions against geocentric navigation, already committed themselves, and thus had an obligation to the public to defend their position, they still refused to answer. As a rejoinder, I told them that I would be including the entire communication between them and myself in this present book. The NASA representatives then demanded that their names be withheld, stating:

We do not give you permission to quote us or use our names in your book or on your website. Although we work at NASA centers, we are not NASA employees and for us to be presented in your work as official representatives of NASA would be inappropriate and misleading.

I have obliged their request, except to quote the above paragraph. My suggestion to them was the following:

As for whether you work for NASA or not, the website has a nasa.gov address. So if you’re not affiliated with NASA then I suggest you find a different website address, since otherwise, you are misleading the public. Of course, we can avoid all this extracurricular activity if you, as an astrophysicist, would tell us why a geocentric system would not work. The ball is in your court.

To this day there has been no response from them. As one can see quite readily from the above exchanges, although one government agency, at least in a private letter, was willing to divulge the truth about the use of fixed-Earth mechanics, another agency refused to be as forthcoming when the audience included the millions of potential readers on the Internet. This is really no surprise to us. Those who control our space programs have a vested interest in keeping the public under the illusion of Copernicanism, since all their funding and projects are based on Copernicus’ premises, including the quest to find life in other worlds. Only those who are courageous and knowledgeable enough can expose the illusion and allow the public to see the cosmic shell game that has been occurring for quite a long time. One such party is the team of Ruyong Wang and Ronald Hatch, two former government satellite engineers who know the truth about the illusion. In one of their investigations on the Global Positioning System they write:

…NavCom Technology, Inc. has licensed software developed by the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) which, because of historical reasons, does the entire computation in the ECI frame. Because of some discrepancies between our standard earth-centered earth-fixed solution results and the JPL results, we investigated the input parameters to the solution very carefully. The measured and theoretical ranges computed in the two different frames agreed precisely, indicating that the Sagnac correction had been applied in each frame.

As the discussion of the Sagnac effect indicates the fundamental question regarding the speed of light is the following: Is the speed of light constant with respect to the observer (receiver) or is it constant with respect to the chosen inertial ECI frame? Clearly the GPS range equation indicates the speed of light is constant with respect to the chosen frame…The JPL equations, used to track signals from interplanetary space probes, verify that the speed of light is with respect to the chosen frame. In the JPL equations, the chosen frame is the solar system barycentric frame….Clearly, the JPL equations treat the speed of light as constant with respect to the frame – not as constant with respect to the receivers.[3]

In other words, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) employs the Earth Centered Inertial frame (ECI) for probes sent out near the Earth (as does NASA and the GPS), yet the Jet Propulsion Lab claims to use the “solar system barycentric frame” for deep space navigation. Wang and Hatch tell us, however, “the Jet Propulsion Lab…because of historical reasons, does the entire computation in the ECI frame.” Not only does the Jet Propulsion Lab use the ECI frame exclusively, Wang and Hatch tell us that the Lab corrects the calculations in its “solar system barycentric frame” so that they match the ECI frame! We can see clearly that the Earth-centered frame is the standard, and thus, use of the ‘solar system barycentric frame’ is superfluous. Once the Lab’s computer makes the corrections to the solar system barycentric frame, in reality the deep space navigation is actually using the ECI frame – a fixed Earth. The public wouldn’t have been made privy to this sleight-of-hand manipulation except for the fact that two knowledgeable insiders, Wang and Hatch, have told the real story. In effect, the Earth Centered Inertial frame (e.g., geocentrism) is the only frame that allows the GPS and various space probes to work properly. The significance of these facts will be highlighted when we deal with the Sagnac Effect in Chapter 5, and the Global Positioning Satellites in Appendix 6.

[1] The original letter was addressed to Charles E. Liddick of the United States Department of Commerce, Office of Satellite Operations, Washington, DC 20233 on November 17, 1989. Mr. Liddick transferred the inquiry to Lee Ranne, from GOES/POLAR Navigation, Office of Satellite Operations at the NOAA offices in the department of National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service, who then wrote to, the questioner, Marshall Hall, on November 22, 1989, with a copy to Mr. Liddick. Original letters are cited in Marshall Hall’s The Earth is Not Moving, Cornelia, Georgia, Fair Education Foundation, 1994, p. 261.

[2] (http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/ask_astro/ask_an_

astronomer.html).  

[3] Ruyong Wang and Ronald R. Hatch, Conducting a Crucial Experiment of the Constancy of the Speed of Light Using GPS, ION GPS 58th Annual Meeting / CIGTF 21st Guidance Test Symposium, 2002, p. 500.

As for the first question, the planets are not traveling anywhere near the speed of light. The planets are traveling their normal speed around the sun, and the sun is traveling at 18.5 miles per second around the earth (assuming that the distance of 93 million miles from earth to sun is correct. The thing that rotates around the earth in 24 hours is the universe itself. According to modern science, this is a fact of science, that is, science allows for a rotating universe around a fixed earth just as it allows a rotating earth in a fixed universe. In fact, in the 1960s physicist Herman Bondi showed that beyond the orbit of Saturn, or what they would call the Schwarzchild radius for our solar system, there is no limitation to how fast the universe can rotate around the earth, especially when they use the rules of General Relativity. The ironic thing is, both Special and General Relativity were invented by Einstein in an effort to answer the experimental evidence from the late 1800s that showed the Earth was standing still in space, but in the process of trying to keep the Earth moving with his Relativity theories, Einstein actually gave credibility to geocentrism. I show all this in my book. At any rate, here is one section of the book that is simple enough for the layman to understand:

Isn’t it Impossible for the Stars

to Travel so Fast Around the Earth?

Another common objection to placing the Earth in the center of our local system is that it would also need to be in the center of the universe, and thus, it would be impossible for the stars, being so far away, to revolve around the Earth on a daily basis, since they would be required to travel faster than the speed of light to complete their daily trek. As with all the objections in this section, we will answer them in more detail in later chapters, but for now we can respond in two ways. First, even assuming for the sake of argument that geocentrism holds that the stars travel faster than light (which it does not); still, those who base their objections on the tenets of modern science have little room to mount criticism. As a popular scientist explains for the novice, in Relativity theory:

…it is permissible to assume that the Earth is a nonrotating frame of reference. From this point of view, the stars will have a circular velocity around the Earth that is much greater than the speed of light. A star only ten light-years away has a relative velocity around the Earth of twenty thousand times the speed of light.[1]

A more technical book on Relativity written for the scientist admits the same:

Relative to the stationary roundabout [the Earth], the distant stars would have…linear velocities exceeding 3 × 10⁸ m/sec, the terrestrial value of the velocity of light. At first sight this appears to be a contradiction…that the velocities of all material bodies must be less than c [the speed of light]. However, the restriction u < c = 3 × 10⁸ m/sec is restricted to the theory of Special Relativity. According to the General theory, it is possible to choose local reference frames in which, over a limited volume of space, there is no gravitational field, and relative to such a reference frame the velocity of light is equal to c…. If gravitational fields are present the velocities of either material bodies or of light can assume any numerical value depending on the strength of the gravitational field. If one considers the rotating roundabout as being at rest, the centrifugal gravitational field assumes enormous values at large distances, and it is consistent with the theory of General Relativity for the velocities of distant bodies to exceed 3 × 10⁸ m/sec under these conditions.[2]

Einstein himself admitted this very principle:

In the second place our result shows that, according to the general theory of relativity, the law of the constancy of the velocity of light in vacuo, which constitutes one of the two fundamental assumptions in the special theory of relativity and to which we have already frequently referred, cannot claim any unlimited validity. A curvature of rays of light can only take place when the velocity of propagation of light varies with position. Now we might think that as a consequence of this, the special theory of relativity and with it the whole theory of relativity would be laid in the dust. But in reality this is not the case. We can only conclude that the special theory of relativity cannot claim an unlimited domain of validity; its results hold only so long as we are able to disregard the influences of gravitational fields on the phenomena (e.g., of light).[3]

Hence, according to Einstein’s own words, a limitation on the speed of light is only true when gravity does not affect the light, or, as a corollary point, variations in the gravitational field will allow variations in the speed of light. Since in a rotating universe the gravitational force increases in proportion to the radial distance from Earth, consequently, the farther the distance, the faster light will be able to travel. As we will see many times in this book, the principles of General Relativity invariably support a geocentric universe.

Another important issue concerning the speed of light is precisely this question: what does modern physics mean when it says that something cannot exceed the speed of light? It’s not what you might logically think. Normally we would interpret the light speed barrier as an inherent property of nature in which, all things being equal, a material object cannot reach the speed of light, since it would actually need to be light in order to travel as fast as light. But this is not how Relativity theory explains it. In a manner of speaking, modern scientists have determined that ‘all things are not equal.’ The ‘inequality’ was invented when science had a very difficult time explaining the result of the 1887 Michelson-Morley experiment. As we noted briefly earlier (and will investigate in much more detail in later chapters), in order to provide modern science an escape from having to conclude that the Earth was motionless in space, various scientists explained the Michelson-Morley experiment by postulating that matter compresses when it moves. First, they committed the most egregious fallacy in logic: using as proof that which they had not first proven. To put it bluntly, they assumed the Earth was moving as the basis to interpret the experiment that appeared to show the Earth wasn’t moving. As one of the world’s premier physicists of that day, Arthur Eddington, put it:

But it now appears that the allowance made for the motion of the observer has hitherto been too crude – a fact overlooked because in practice all observers share nearly the same motion, that of the Earth. Physical space and time are found to be closely bound up with this motion of the observer.[4]

In this case, Michelson’s sensitive instruments, specifically designed to detect the Earth’s motion, were said to register a “null” result for such an effect because, due to the pressure generated by the assumed orbit of the Earth, the instruments shrank during the course of the experiment. As Eddington put it: “This would mean that the Earth’s diameter in the direction of its motion is shortened by 2½ inches.”[5] Having no other way to prohibit the Earth from being motionless in space, most scientists succumbed to the “shrinking matter” hypothesis, and soon it became standard fare in the world of physics. Dubbed as the “Fitzgerald contraction,” and later made into an equation called the “Lorentz transformation,” it was so readily accepted that it became the pat answer to every motion problem in physics. Among those answers 

was why no object could ever reach the speed of light. As physicist Arthur Eddington explains it:

It is no use trying to overtake a flash of light; however fast you go it is always traveling away from you at 186,000 miles a second. Now from one point of view this is a rather unworthy deception that Nature has practiced upon us. Let us take our favourite observer who travels at 161,000 miles a second and send him in pursuit of the flash of light. It is going 25,000 miles a second faster than he is; but that is not what he will report. Owing to the contraction of his standard scale his miles are only half-miles; owing to the slowing down of his clocks his seconds are double-seconds. His measurement would therefore make the speed 100,000 miles a second (really half-miles per double-second). He makes a further mistake in synchronizing the clocks with which he records the velocity….This brings the speed up to 186,000 miles a second. From his own point of view the traveler is lagging hopelessly behind the light; he does not realize what a close race he is making of it, because his measuring appliances have been upset.[6]

So here we see that the “traveler” is, as Eddington admits, coming close to, and could possibly match, the speed of light, but because his instruments have shrunk and his clock moves slower due to his excessive speed, it will only appear as if it is impossible to catch the light beam. Welcome to the bizarre world of Relativity. On the stage is reality versus illusion, but by the very nature of its principles, Relativity is at a loss to tell us which part is reality and which part is illusion. Perhaps this is why Eddington had few qualms once referring to the Fitzgerald contraction as: “The shortening of the moving rod is true, but it is not really true.”[7] Of course, we need to remind ourselves that the so-called ‘shrinking of the instruments’ and ‘slowing of the clock’ is all the result of the fallacious interpretation of the Michelson-Morley experiment, an interpretation that was forced upon the science establishment in order to keep the Earth from being motionless in space. To this very day, no scientist in the world has ever explained, let alone proven, the precise physical reason why matter should shrink in length when it moves, or how time can dilate in the process, yet they believe it nonetheless, for, as we will see later, it is their only defense against going back to pre-Copernican days.

We can also answer the objection by noting that, although it is to our advantage to use modern physics against itself as we do when we point out that General Relativity permits a body to move faster than the speed of light, the celestial mechanics of geocentrism, in fact, does not claim that the stars move faster than light. Geocentrism says only that the universe rotates around the Earth once per day, and in that rotation it carries the stars with it. Thus, compared to the universe within which they are contained, the stars are not moving at all, save for their minuscule independent movements.

Mechanically speaking, the rotation of the universe is an integral facet of the geocentric system so as to act as a counterbalance to the inward pressure of gravity. It just so happens that the centrifugal force created by a 24-hour rotation period prohibits the stars and other material in the universe from collapsing inward (a problem, incidentally, that Newton and Einstein recognized in their respective universes, which Newton attempted to answer by opting for an infinite universe, and Einstein by his infamous “cosmological constant,” neither of which provided an adequate solution). An advocate of Relativity can raise no objections against geocentrism’s rotating universe since Relativity sees no difference, or has no way to distinguish between, a rotating Earth among fixed stars or stars that revolve around a fixed Earth. The two are relativistically equivalent.

[1] Martin Gardner, Relativity Explosion, 1976, p. 68.

[2] An Introduction to the Theory of Relativity, William Geraint Vaughn Rosser, 1964, p. 460. W. G. V. Rosser, Ph.D. was the senior lecturer in Physics at Exeter University.

[3] Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory, authorized translation by Robert W. Lawson, 1961, p. 85.

[4] Arthur Eddington, Space, Time and Gravitation: An Outline of the General Relativity Theory, 1923, p. v. Interestingly enough, Eddington later decries man’s tendency to assume certain things as true which have not been proven. He writes: “Now the most dangerous hypotheses are those which are tacit and unconscious. So the standpoint of relativity proposes tentatively to do without these hypotheses (not making any others in their place); and it discovers that they are quite unnecessary and are not supported by any known fact” (ibid., p. 28). Unfortunately, Eddington failed to see a moving Earth as one of those beliefs “not supported by any known fact.” In various other places, Eddington confirms our suspicions of his predisposition: “It is well to remember that there is reasonable justification for adopting the principle of relativity even if the evidence is insufficient to prove it” (ibid., p. 21).

[5] Space, Time and Gravitation, p. 20. He continues with the same question-begging logic in the next sentence: “The Michelson-Morley experiment has thus failed to detect our motion through the aether, because the effect looked for – the delay of one of the light waves – is exactly compensated by an automatic contraction of the matter forming the apparatus.”

[6] Sir Arthur Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, from the 1927 Gifford Lectures, 1929, p. 54. All spellings of words in the quote are from Eddington’s British.

[7] Arthur S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, pp. 33-34, emphasis his. Opposed to Eddington, some Relativists believe: (1) “The contraction is real.” Møller writes: “Contraction is a real effect observable in principle by experiment…This means the concept of length has lost its absolute meaning” (Møller, The Theory of Relativity, 1972, p. 44); Wolfgang Pauli: “It therefore follows that the Lorentz contraction is not a property of a single rod taken by itself, but a reciprocal relation between two such rods moving relatively to each other, and this relation is in principle observable” (The Theory of Relativity, Dover Publications, 1958, pp. 12-13); R. C. Tolman: “Entirely real but symmetrical” (Relativity Thermodynamics and Cosmology, pp. 23-24). (2) “The contraction is not real.” E. F. Taylor and John Wheeler write: “Does something about a clock really change when it moves, resulting in the observed change in the tick rate? Absolutely not!” (Spacetime Physics: Introduction to Special Relativity, p. 76). (3) “The contraction is only apparent.” Aharoni writes: “The moving rod appears shorter. The moving clock appears to go slow” (The Special Theory of Relativity, p. 21); McCrea writes: “The apparent length is reduced. Time intervals appear to be lengthened; clocks appear to go slow” (Relativity Physics, pp. 15-16); Nunn: “A moving rod would appear to be shortened” (Relativity and Gravitation, pp. 43-44); Whitrow: “Instead of assuming that there are real, i.e., structural changes in length and duration owing to motion, Einstein’s theory involves only apparent changes” (The Natural Philosophy of Time, p. 255). (4) “The contraction is the result of the relativity of simultaneity.” Bohn writes: “When measuring lengths and intervals, observers are not referring to the same events” (The Special Theory of Relativity, p. 59). See also William Rosser, Introductory Relativity, p. 37; and A. P. French, Special Relativity, p. 97; and Stephenson and Kilmister, Special Relativity for Physicists, pp. 38-39. (5) “The contraction is due to perspective effects.” Rindler writes: “Moving lengths are reduced, a kind of perspective effect. But of course nothing has happened to the rod itself. Nevertheless, contraction is no illusion, it is real” (Introduction to Special Relativity, p. 25). (6) “The contraction is mathematical.” Herman Minkowski writes: “This hypothesis sounds extremely fantastical, for the contraction is not to be looked upon as a consequence of resistances in the ether, or anything of that kind, but simply as a gift from above, – as an accompanying circumstance of the circumstance of motion” (“Space and Time,” in The Principle of Relativity: A Collection of Original Memoirs on the Special and General Theory of Relativity by H. A. Lorentz, A. Einstein, H. Minkowski and H. Weyl, translated by W. Perrett and G. B. Jeffery from the original 1923 edition, Dover Publications, 1952, p. 81).

Hi Robert,

I agree it is an open topic for discussion and I think it's great this is being discussed.  Did you have any comment to make on Benedict's remarks/argument?

Matthew

R. Sungenis: Yes. I forgot to add that in. I only scanned his remarks but I would say they are along the same lines as Chrysostom -- just going on what he thinks he knows without really studying the issue to see if it is correct. I'm not saying he is wrong, I'm just saying that one could not draw from his remarks any kind of definitive conclusion. Respect for the pope also means that we not saddle him with saying something definitive when he is not doing so. Pinning something on the pope before he has had time to investigate it thoroughly is just as bad as disobeying him when he says something definitively.

Hi Robert,

This is just a few comments on the interesting topic of whether the Last Supper was the passover.  Like most people I grew up on the majority opinion that the Last Supper was the Passover.  However I'm quite open to the alternative view that you present.

There are none the less some difficulties that remain on this question.  The first is Patristic support.  Have you done a survery of what the Fathers have to say on the status of the Last Supper?  I found by looking up Aquinas' Contra Errores Greaecorum this quote:

"To this, however, Chrysostom replies, commenting on that very text of John: That they might not be defiled, etc.: “What does this mean, but that they ate the Passover on another day and broke the law in order that they might fulfill the most wicked desire of their soul in the death of Christ; Christ, however, did not transgress Holy Thursday in paschal week, but on that day he ate the Passover.” (Lib. 108, 3-8, from Chrysostom Super Matth. hom. 84, n 2 (PG 58, 754).)"

So just doing a small bit of research that is one significant Father on side (not to mention with Thomas' support).

Also have a look at this homily from Benedict XVI.  I'm not suggesting it is authoritative but he offers in there a defense of the Last Supper being the Passover especially based on new knowledge from the Dead Sea Scrolls:

http://uvcarmel.org/2008/03/19/the-last-supper-explained-homily-of-his-holiness-benedict-xvi/

God Bless,

Matthew

R. Sungenis: Matthew, my position on this, and topics like it, is that which is given by Leo XIII in Providentissimus Deus. Unless the Fathers have thoroughly investigated a topic, and after that are in consensus on the interpretation of it, then we are not obliged to court their opinion. We may use it as a help or even a thought-starter, but not as anything definitive. This would be especially true if only a few Fathers commented on the topic. And, when we find that the few that treated the topic merely make an assertion (as does Chrysostom's above) and do not provide any detailed exegesis of the passage in question, then it really has little value for us. Leo XIII taught that in such cases, we are obligated to go to Scripture and examine the original languages, which is what I did in my essay on the topic. If someone wants to challenge my position, then they would be required to deal with the exegesis of the passage I offer rather than quote a Father here or there that said something different but without any exegesis. In the larger picture, although the Fathers can be very valuable in arriving at truth, Catholics, by and large, need to refrain from proof-texting their way through the Fathers. We also need to remember that the Fathers did not have any special guidance from the Holy Spirit. They have many opinions on many subjects. In a way, we, today, are in a better position to judge the truth in various instances, since we have the whole patristic and medieval eras to consult; we also have the various instances in which the Church has dogmatized a certain belief, and we also have a great knowledge of the original languages which most of the Fathers and medievals did not have, since most only knew Latin. In a way, we are in a much better position to determine whether Jesus and the Apostles celebrated the Passover on Thursday night. At the least, it is an open topic of discussion.

Robert, could you please explain what Christ meant when he said a sin against the Holy Spirit would not be forgiven either in this world or in the next? And could you please give a couple of examples of such sins...thank you. regards, tom

R. Sungenis: Tom, you might want to do a search in our BTF search engine (on the home page) for more detail, because we have answered this question several times in the past. But basically, the sin against the Holy Spirit originated when Jesus did miracles with the Pharisees as eyewitnesses yet the Pharisees refused to believe in Jesus. This means that the Pharisees were hardening their heart against Jesus, refusing to accept that he was truly the Son of God, yet knowing in their hearts that only someone from God could do the miracles that Jesus was doing (see Mark 3:1-30). It got to the point that the Pharisees explained Jesus' miracles by claiming that he was under the power of the devil (Mark 3:30). They knew they had to attribute the miracles to some supernatural or preternatural power, so they chose the devil instead of the Holy Spirit. In doing so, they commit blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. The Church, in turn, regards blasphemy against the Holy Spirit as the sin in which someone deliberately and intentionally refuses to believe even though God has made himself very evident to them. This occurs when someone deliberately and intentionally falls from the faith so as to take God out of their life (See Catholic Catechism, para. 1864). It is similar to the reason that St. Paul says that if one falls from the faith (commits the sin of apostasy) it is "impossible" to restore him to repentance (Hebrews 6:4-6).

CAI, Maybe you could do an  article on the Jews as a Deicide Race, one that is cursed with the blood of Jesus, unless they convert of course. The list of Fathers and theologians, who held and believed this for 2000 years, and until recently in spite of N.Aetatae, which is NOT binding on the Catholic conscience is almost limitless.

R. Sungenis: The Church has never officially taught anywhere that the Jews at large are a deicide race. The whole notion is absurd. The only "deicide" the Church knows in relation to the Jews is their persistent attempt to kill the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

Hi Robert,

I don't know if the system you have set up for emails will allow me to reply, but I will attempt it. If my email is long, I apologize. I know you are busy. I would be willing to pay another 3 dollars- the problem is I am not sure the paypal would permit such a lengthily reply. After my next pay period I will consider a small donation to your cause for your time.

First, by the way-- I know some friends of yours.  I am a graduate of Saint Charles Borremeo Seminary three years ago.  Dr. Christian Washburn was one of my professors.  I really enjoyed his classes, and I enjoyed him.  He says he knows you.  Father Peter Stravinskus is a friend of mine.  He says he knows you too.  Another friend of mine- Father Greg Villescusa now a priest for my Diocese (Scranton PA) was in the Mt. Pocono Oratory when it was functioning and he said he met you when you came for a visit.  I met Father Stravinskus because I was assigned as a Transitional Deacon at the Church right next to him in 2007.  I went over to have him autograph my CD of him and James White debating the subject of Purgatory. I was ordained a priest in June of 2008. Father is currently residing in NJ. Last I saw him was August when I was vacationing at the Jersey Shore.  I drove up to see him.

On to your answer: Yes it helps. Both answers are plausible and very through.  I think however, that perhaps I was not as clear as I should have been with my question. You seem to have understood me as asking whether Lot sinned by offering his daughters to homosexuals. Clearly you seem to indicate he probably did not commit a sin.  Your answers certainly seem plausible.

I wasn't exactly asking that however.  Let me try to put my question another way.

I have been doing some small research on this- over the Internet since I am not close to a theology library.  Unfortunately the majority of articles I have come across try to argue for the Sin as being in-hospitable. Few make the case the sin was homosexuality. 

Based on the little bit of research I have done which I admit is far from scholarly, here is what I found:

1)  Everyone seems willing to admit Sodom and Gomorrah were perverse in their ways.

2)  Everyone seems willing to grant that the society at large of Sodom and Gomorrah was

      sexually perverse.

3)  Everyone seems willing to grant that in-hospitality was part of the perverseness of the culture. 

      It appears that good manners and welcoming strangers were highly prized among the Jewish

      Culture. Secondly the prophets refer to Sodom and Gomorrah, and do not mention the

      sexual perversion- but rather the Social Injustices.  Jesus the same.  Passages such as Jude

      and 2 Peter make reference to Sodom and Gomorrah, but from what I have read, it is not

      entirely implausible that the passages in question refer to the general sexual perverseness

      of society, not specifically homosexuality. I am not saying they don't, I am simply saying the

      other explanations seem plausible.

The disagreement is over whether or not we can find a clear condemnation of homosexuality within the passage itself. Liberals would answer in the negative, Conservatives would answer in the affirmative. Based on my research so far---(again which I admit is far from scholarly) I am not fully convinced that God condemned Sodom and Gomorrah solely because of homosexuality.  Now let me say that I myself am no liberal, and I am in full support of the Church's teaching regarding the homosexual life-style.  I am not a dissident Catholic priest.  I just write that to tell you that I am not approaching the passage with a liberal bias.

Here is what I believe so far:  My thesis is that God condemned Sodom and Gomorrah.  The reason was because of their overall sinful perversion of which homosexuality was a part.  I am not convinced that God condemned them solely because of the sin of homosexuality nor am I convinced that the passage itself wants to answer the very specific question of whether homosexuality itself is sinful.  I think the passage speaks far broader in scope then that.

Perhaps one could make an argument that the sin of homosexuality was one of the principle reasons, or sins of the culture, but I do not believe it was the sole reason. I simply believe the culture had become so perverse and crooked that God decided to wipe them out in punishment. In fact as your article states God had already decided to wipe them out even before this incident takes place.  This means this incident has no bearing on anything.  It simply illustrates yet another example of how perverse the culture is. Strangers show up- and all the men are interested in is sex.  The passage makes it clear they are homosexuals- but the passage itself does not indicate anything regarding homosexual relations itself- but rather an overall sexual perversion by which the people serve their passions so much- they look upon strangers as sexual objects all for their pleasure, rather then people who should be served with kindness.  Clearly the culture was self absorbed in pleasures of the flesh, such that they were dominated by that- not unlike modern America.

I would say that if we isolate this passage from the rest of Scripture- we would not see a clear directive regarding God's thoughts on hetero-sexual/ homosexual relationships.  What we would see is that gang rape is certainly sinful, and that their desires reflected the perverseness of the culture at large- especially with regard to welcoming strangers. 

Hence, to say Sodom and Gomorrah were condemned because of in hospitality is not plausible because that the culture was in-hospitable was the tip of the iceberg.  To say however that they were condemned solely because they were homosexual also does not seem plausible to me- because it seems that that God pays attention only to homosexuality apart from everything else.  It makes it seem as though God can tolerate everything else but homosexuality- it is that sexual perversion which pushes Him over the edge.  So again, Sodom and Gomorrah were condemned for their overarching Sins and perversions of which homosexuality was a part- but not the sole part. But to try to use this passage as a proof-text specifically against homosexuality goes beyond the passage.

Your thoughts?

God Bless!

Father Dave Bechtel

R. Sungenis: Father Bechtel, sorry I got on the wrong track. I don’t think by the way you phrased the question, however, that I would have ever arrived at what you were really after. In any case, thank you for the kind and detailed clarification. Before I begin, please give my regards to Dr. Chris Washburn and Father Greg Villescusa that you mentioned above. I haven’t seen or talked with them in quite a while. Please tell them that I am now the father of ten children, probably about six more than when I corresponded with them last.

As for your question, let me start with your last sentence: “But to try to use this passage as a proof-text specifically against homosexuality goes beyond the passage.”

This assertion of yours depends on what you mean by “beyond the passage.” Certainly, if one is looking for a statement in Genesis 19 saying “Thou shalt not commit homosexuality,” yes, in that sense trying to get a “proof-text” out of the text could seemingly “go beyond the passage.” Because Genesis 19 is an historical narrative rather than a detailed codification of law like Leviticus 18, it has its limits as to what can be used as specific textual or doctrinal “proof.”

However, just as Jesus deduced in Matthew 22:31-32 from his reading of the historical narrative of Exodus 3:6, a deduction that allowed him to conclude that Abraham was presently living and had already experienced a resurrection, we can likewise deduce from Genesis 19 that the sin which was condemned and worthy of death was homosexuality, not inhospitality.

First, the sin of inhospitality never involves the offer, acceptance or performance of a sexual act, whether it’s heterosexual or homosexual. Inhospitality, as used and defined in tradition, scripture and catechetical teaching refers only to the refusal to relieve the ostensible physical or mental needs of another person.

Second, to say that the homosexuals clamoring at Lot’s door were guilty of inhospitality is like saying that Charles Manson was guilty of breaking and entering when he went into the house of Sharon Tate and murdered her. Or it would be like saying that although Bill Clinton was guilty of adultery with Monica Lewinski, he was also guilty of inhospitality when he failed to clean Monica’s stained blue dress, or that he was being inhospitable for not returning her phone calls once she appeared on CNN. I’m sure you can see the absurdity in that line of argumentation.

We must also remember that the “inhospitality” argument originally surfaced in the 1970s from those who were trying to replace homosexuality as the sin of Sodom, not include it alongside homosexuality. The American Psychiatric Association had a hand in this. They apparently understood that to say the Sodomites were guilty of both homosexuality and inhospitality would be like killing a gnat with a sledge hammer. They were pushing the inhospitality argument because they had already dismissed homosexuality as a moral evil and decided to make it a God-given freedom. Of course, they had a very difficult time explaining why God would cast fire and brimstone upon people simply for refusing to have tea and crumpets with the new men in town.

Conversely, to attempt to play both sides of the fence and argue that Sodom was guilty of both homosexuality and inhospitality (as Clifford and Murphy attempt to do in the New Jerome Biblical Commentary but, ironically, without a commentary, see p. 23), and from this make the claim that Genesis 19 cannot be used as a proof text against homosexuality, is akin to the hair-splitting of biblical texts common among the Pharisees. The Pharisees practiced this perverted form of exegesis so they could escape the moral requirements of the law through the gathering of legal loopholes that seemingly allowed them to continue their sins against humanity. I hope that is not the case with Clifford and Murphy, for Jesus had a very stern warning against such eisegesis of biblical texts – you shall receive the greater damnation. (Mk 12:40).

By the same token, those who try to wiggle out of Genesis 19 by saying that the Sodomites were destroyed for all kinds of sexual sin and not just homosexuality, and therefore Genesis 19 cannot be used as a proof text against homosexuality alone, are only digging their grave deeper. If the text had only condemned homosexuality and not every other sexual sin common among the Sodomites, then the text would be guilty of implicitly condoning all non-homosexual varieties of sexual perversions. Hence, to cover all the perversions, all is condemned. It just so happens that homosexuality was at the top of the list since it was apparently the only sin at that moment that was banging on Lot’s door.

Lastly, the object of this exercise is not to see if we can find “proof-texts,” especially, as I said above, from historical narratives that don’t lend themselves to giving proof-texts. Exegesis of Scripture is not governed by legal “proof” but by the implicit and explicit data in the text that has to be properly interpreted by a qualified person, a person who uses the whole of Scripture, the whole of Tradition, and the specific interpretations of similar passages published by the Magisterium. As such, all this information allows us to conclude that the text clearly denounces homosexuality as a sin of the most perverse nature, and one that cries to God for quick and decisive judgment.

I hope my perspective helps in your endeavor to understand this passage.

God be with you.

Hi Robert,

Thank you kindly for your detailed reply.  I will use it in my class as we discuss the passage.

I especially enjoyed the "For simply refusing to have tea and crumpets with the new men in town."  That had me laughing!

God bless your 10 children!  Maybe one of them will become a priest. 

I will get a small donation to your organization sometime after November 20. I will do it on my credit card through your website.   I have your volumes on Sola Scriptura, Sola Fide, and the Eucharist. I have read parts of them- but have not read all of them yet.

God Bless!

Father Dave Bechtel

Robert,

I am teaching a moral theology class and we are going over your article on Homosexuality.

My question: I do not understand why Lot offered his daughter for the sexual pleasure of the rapists.  What is the signifance of that, and why is that not condemned as well?  It seems the argument advanced by Liberal Scripture "Scholars" hinges somewhat on that fact.

Can you please help?

God Bless

Father Dave Bechtel

R. Sungenis: Father Bechtel, this certainly is a puzzling passage but I have two slightly different scenarios as to what may be happening behind the scenes.

First, what may be occurring is a little trickery on Lot’s part to alleviate the pressure of the situation, at least temporarily, until something can be done. I sense this from the commentary that is given in 2 Peter 2:8-9 which says that the homosexuals were badgering Lot “day after day,” and then says “The Lord knows how to deliver the godly out of trial.”

We know ahead of time that, despite Lot’s offering of his daughters to the crowd of homosexuals, the daughters were never given to them. Hence, Lot is not guilty of actually turning the daughters over to these monsters. The most he could be guilty of is the potentiality of putting his daughters in harm’s way.

To dismiss even this potential guilt, however, what could be going through Lot’s mind is that since he knows the homosexual men outside his door only want to have sexual relations with the two men (which were two angels in disguise), he could offer them his daughters knowing that the homosexuals would not take the daughters. In other words, Lot may be offering the daughters will little intention of carrying it out, or at least hoping that he won’t have to carry it out if God would intervene. God indeed comes to his rescue by having the angels take him inside and strike the men outside with blindness. Accordingly, we could also say that “God delivered Lot from this trial” and that God would not allow the temptation for Lot to be greater than he could sustain (see 1 Cor 10:13) so that, even if Lot had some ulterior intentions of giving his daughters to the men, God was not going to allow him to be tempted to that point, and thus decided to end the situation by having the angels intervene.

The other possibility I see is that we can start with Lot’s two daughters. In the remaining context, they don’t appear to be the epitome of virtue and spirituality. In the same chapter (Gen 19:30-38), they both plot against Lot by enticing him from a drunken stupor to have intercourse with each of them.  Daughters don’t learn this kind of behavior overnight, which then makes us wonder just what kind of girls they were at home. We already know that their mother was a tempestuous woman and was not living a life of faith and obedience since her act of turning back to look at the city was a direct act of disobedience. God would not have judged her so harshly unless her act was a deliberate and calculated one (cf. Num 15:30-31; 2Sam 6:6-7). So we may have a case of “like mother, like daughter” here. The other factor is that the two husbands-to-be of the two daughters are also faithless and disobedient, for they ignore Lot’s plea for them to leave the city before it is destroyed (Gen 19:14).

So the lingering question here is: what kind of daughters would pick these kinds of derelict husbands and then entice their own father into intercourse? This leads me to suggest that Lot already knew the untoward inclinations of his daughters (even though the text says they did not have intercourse with any man prior to the incident).

When we add up all of this, it is not a pretty scene. Lot must have known that the two husbands are lacking virtue. He also finds that his intuition about his daughters turns out to be true as they entrap him into illicit intercourse; and his wife, being as brazen as she was against God’s command, is probably no picnic to live with. Added to this is the fact that he is living in a city that has reached the human limits of debauchery. This is not just a one day affair of homosexuals pounding on the door. 2 Peter 2:8 says that these people badgered Lot “day after day,” and that he was “tormented” by this barrage of unbridled sexual perversion. So this poor man is at his wits end. So, in a moment of desperation, Lot offers them his daughters. Whether he really intends to give them his daughters we don’t know for certain, but if he actually does it he will be in deep sin. But here again, based on his past faithfulness to God, God saves him from this temptation (1Cor 10:13 comes into play) and Lot does not fall into this sin since the angels remedy the situation.

The last factor to be included is Lot himself. Already in Gen 13:7-13 we see Lot choosing the lush land near Sodom (which according to verse 13 was already known to be in debauchery) as his place of residence. Lot gets himself into trouble here because the residents kidnap him and his family and Abraham has to come and rescue him (Gen 14:12). After all this, Lot remains in the same area of Sodom. Not very smart. He is asking for trouble, and he certainly gets it. So here we have a man who, though he has faith in God, still seems tempted by the world. This kind of man may make rash decisions since he has traits of being double-minded (see James 1:8).

All in all, from a moral perspective, Lot may have potentially sinned if he really did intend to throw his daughters to the men, but we cannot tell from the context that such was really his intention. So I see no grave sin here, at least none that we can positively pin on Lot. In any case, so that the situation did not deteriorate any further such that Lot might fall into sin (since other texts suggest that he was not the strongest of characters), God intervenes and saves Lot and the daughters. This is what we pray in the Lord’s prayer: “And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.”

Let me know if this helps at all.

God be with you.

[Email to L. Gonzaga and forwarded to R. Sungenis]

Hi,

I was wondering if Sungenis could address Romans 4:4 and how it uses the Greek word logizomai. From the way I see logizomai used in 4:4 (sandwiched between the important 4:3 and 4:5), the Protestant notion of 'impute' appears to be solidly contradicted.

Could you ask Robert about this? If my argument is true, then he could really hammer James White in a debate on 'imputation of Christ's righteousness', because logizomai isn't being used that way.

God Bless,

Nick

R. Sungenis: Nick, we addressed logizomai in my book Not By Faith Alone. Starting at page 302 in the 2nd edition, I've copied and pasted the relevant paragraphs for you. If you have any further questions, please let me know.

“And it was Credited unto Him as Righteousness”

We must now investigate one of the most popular Protestant arguments for the concept of imputed righteousness. This matter concerns the use of the Greek word logizomai, translated as: “reckoned,” “credited,” “accepted,” “counted,” “considered.”[1] The lexical definition carries several meanings as well: reckon, calculate, take into account, put on someone’s account, estimate, evaluate, look upon as, consider, think, dwell on, believe, be of the opinion of.[2] Protestant exegesis, especially that of Romans 4 where the Greek word appears twelve times, has consistently understood the word in the sense of “credited.” As noted earlier, the analogy drawn to describe the righteousness credited to Abraham in Romans 4 is that of an accountant giving a “credit” to Abraham’s ledger book, a credit that was secured completely by the work of Christ in the atonement. Abraham is understood as one who has “something to his credit” so that when God looks at his ledger book, as it were, he sees that, in accounting terms, Abraham is in the black. Evangelical Joel Beeke comments on this verb:

This verb most often indicates “what a person, considered by himself, is not, or does not have, but is reckoned, held or regarded to be, or to have. It is clear then that when Abraham was justified by his faith, the righteousness which was reckoned or “charged to his account” was a righteousness not his own but that of another, namely, the righteousness of Christ.[3]

Unfortunately, this analysis presents a false premise which leads to a false conclusion. First, the Greek verb logizomai does not “most often indicate” what someone or something is merely “considered” to be but is not so in reality. The New Testament uses logizomai 41 times. Most of these refer to what someone is thinking as a mental representation of the reality they are witnessing.[4]  In only a few instances is the word possibly used as a mental representation of something that does not exist in reality.[5] Hence, the preponderant evidence shows that the word “credited” denotes more of what is recognized or understood intrinsically of a person or thing than a mere crediting to the person or thing something that is not intrinsic to it. In the case of Abraham, for example, we can understand the phrase “his faith is reckoned as righteousness” in Rm 4:5 such that God is recognizing or viewing Abraham’s faith as righteousness, or that God interpreted the faith Abraham demonstrated as righteousness, or both. This is very different from saying that God merely “credited” Abraham with righteousness as if to say that Abraham was not really showing any righteous qualities when he demonstrated his faith but that God, because of the alien righteousness of Christ, merely gave him the label of righteousness.

The Protestant failure to understand the word logizomai as including a recognition of the inherent righteousness of the individual has led to some fallacious criticisms of Catholic theology. Protestant theologians have given such a limited spectrum to the Catholic view of justification that they have erroneously divorced certain elements from the definition that are vital to its complete understanding. This attempt is evident in the “proof texts” that Protestant theologians amass to show that “to justify” does not mean “to make righteous.” We have already seen an example of this in the writings of one major Protestant theologian who claimed that Augustine misinterpreted the Hebrew and Greek words for “to justify” by using the Latin word justificare to translate them.[6] Other attempts have used similar etymological and linguistic arguments. The effort is to divorce any declaratory dimension from the Catholic concept of justification in an attempt to reserve such language for the Protestant viewpoint. This tends to put the Catholic concept of justification in a theological vacuum, isolating it so that it can be attacked. For example, in his 1841 work on the Protestant concept of justification, Charles Hodge gathered twelve passages that he believed provided the definitive proof that “justified” and its derivatives did not mean “to make righteous,” rather, “to declare or pronounce righteous.” Hodge’s thesis attempts to create a false dichotomy in the reader’s mind between something that God declares and something that He recognizes within the individual.

To prove his case, Hodge points out the following passages: Dt 25:1 (“If there be a controversy between men, and they come into judgment, that the judges may judge them, then they shall justify the righteous, and condemn the wicked”); Ex 23:7 (“I shall not justify the wicked”): Jb 32:2 (“because he justified himself rather than God”): Ps 51:4 (“that you might be justified when you speak”); Pr 17:15 (“He that justifies the wicked is an abomination to the Lord”); Is 5:23 (“which justify the wicked for reward”); Mt 11:19 (“wisdom is justified of her children”); Lk 7:29 (“All the people that heard him, and the publicans, justified God”); Lk 10:29 (“He wishing to justify himself”); Lk 16:15 (“You are they which justify yourselves before men”); Gl 2:16 (“A man is not justified by works of the law”); Gl 5:4 (“Whosoever of you are justified by the law you have fallen from grace”). In reference to these passages, Hodge concludes:

The word expresses a judgment, whether of the mind, as when one justified another for his conduct, or officially of a judge. If such be the established meaning of the word, it ought to settle all controversy as to the nature of justification. We are bound to take the word of Scripture in their true and established sense. And, therefore, when the Bible says, “God justifies the believer,” we are not at liberty to say that it means that he pardons, or that he sanctifies him. It means, and can mean only, that he pronounces him just.[7]

Here Hodge makes the same mistake that Beeke had made in the understanding of the Greek work logizomai (“credited”), yet in the reverse direction. Hodge admits that “to justify” can refer to the occasion when “one man justifies another for his conduct,” which shows that he is aware that to call one “justified” means that the designator recognizes rightful “conduct” in the individual. This understanding is precisely what we found in critiquing Beeke’s use of logizomai. As noted above, Beeke failed to see that logizomai referred not only to considering something as existent that was not really so, but considering it as existent because one recognizes that the quality which one has “considered” actually exists within the object observed. Using Hodge’s words, we can say that man pronounces the other man “just” because he observes that the other man possesses and has demonstrated just behavior. In many of the “proof texts” that Hodge cites to show that “to justify” means “pronounce,” upon critical examination the passages reveal that what is “pronounced” is what is actually existent. For example, in Dt 25:1, the man who has actually exhibited justice is only then justified by the judges. Hence, it is not valid for Hodge to use such a verse to support the Protestant concept that one is “pronounce” just who is not righteous intrinsically. The Protestant view fails to see that God can “pronounce” someone justified because God see that the person has exhibited good “conduct.” If anything, the Scripture’s use of “to justify” supports the Catholic view since Scripture does not ascribe the word to an individual who has not shown righteous qualities.

Hodge’s other “proof texts” exhibit the same problem. Most of the passages Hodge picks are negative in character, i.e., they portray the attempt of one party to falsely justify himself or another party, e.g., Jb 32:2; Is 5:23; Pr 17:15; Lk 10:29; 16:15. These do not prove his point, however. They merely show that it is invalid to apply the term “justified” or “righteous” to someone who is inherently evil or who has performed evil actions. If anything, the use of the term “justified” in these passages proves that the word can only be used when a righteous quality is recognizable in the individual observed. The remaining passage Hodge cites speak of God being justified, e.g., Ps 51:4; Jb 32:2; Lk 7:29. But again, the same critique can be applied: God is justified because he has the quality of justice within him, or because he is the subsisting source of all goodness and thus of all justice. This use of justified is in direct opposition to the Protestant conception. If anything, recognizing that God is justified in what he is and does proves the Catholic view of justification, not the Protestant view.

Evangelical James White uses the same argument as Hodge. He adds that there is a “legal” context in view when the word “justify” appears. After quoting Dt 25:1 (“If there be a controversy between men, and they come into judgment, that the judges may judge them, then they shall justify the righteous, and condemn the wicked”), White states, “Note the context: a law court. To justify the righteous obviously means to give a legal, forensic declaration regarding a person’s proper standing before the law.”[8] First, it is very misleading to support the notion of forensic imputation by appealing to the “courtroom” context of Dt 25:1 for the simple fact that the Old Testament also used the word “justify” in many non-courtroom situations. Thus it is not its use in the courtroom that makes the word legal. In reality, because of the general meaning of the word “justify” it can be used in many different contexts, most having nothing to do with the courtroom or anything of a legal nature.

Following this, White makes a further remark on Dt 25:1:

This is clearly seen here by the term that is paralleled with the act of justifying: to condemn. Neither involves a subjective change of the individual; the righteous man was righteous inwardly even before the declaration of his righteousness, just as the guilty man was guilty before the proclamation of his guilt and condemnation. This is the source of Paul’s understanding of justification in the New Testament. Paul’s use of the terms demands that this be so. The conjunction of the two terms “impute” and “to justify” in Paul’s teachings clearly show that the Protestant understanding of God’s declaration of the righteousness of the believer is the biblical one.[9]

Here White tries to turn the tables but in the end he traps himself. It is granted that there is no “subjective change” on the individual in this courtroom scene. White’s diagnosis of the verse is correct when he says, “the righteous man was righteous inwardly even before the declaration of his righteousness.” But White fails to see two things in this admission: (1) there is no need for a “subjective change” specifically because the individual was already subjectively righteous; (2) that the term “justify” is being used to recognize this subjective righteousness. In other words, the term “justify” is not being assigned to an individual who lacks inwardly righteous qualities. He is being given the term “just” precisely because that word best describes his inward condition. No one, especially not judges, should designate as “just” someone who is not intrinsically just in the matter at hand. This is a real problem for the Protestant position for it holds that in the imputation of righteousness there is neither a subjective change nor a recognition of inward righteousness in the individual. To the Protestant, it is necessary to give the individual the label “righteous” precisely because there is nothing righteous about him. We know that agrees with this position because in the following pages (pp. 156-158) he supports Luther’s analogy of the dunghill covered with snow. But if Dt 25:1 is, as White says, “the source of Paul’s understanding of justification,” then Paul should be using the term “justify” not as a label for someone who is still unrighteous but for one in whom he recognizes righteous qualities. Hence, for White, Dt 25:1 simply proves too much. For Catholicism, there is no problem with Dt 25:1 because in assigning the word “justified” to an individual she sees either the making righteous or the recognition of that inward righteousness. This is possible because justification is not solitary and static but is fluid.

White then attempts to support his theory by referencing a usage of the Greek logizomai in Lv 17:4 of the LXX. White quotes a portion of the verse with the words,

Any man who did not bring an animal he had slaughtered to the door of the tabernacle as an offering to the Lord, as the Scripture says, “bloodguiltiness is to be reckoned to that man.” Surely this guilt is not infused into the man, but he is legally declared guilty of blood.

Here White reveals a fatal flaw in his analysis. First, in failing to quote the remainder of the verse he hides from the reader the very reason the man was reckoned as “bloodguilty.” The verse actually reads, “…the man shall be considered guilty of bloodshed; he has shed blood and must be cut off from his people.” We notice here that the man is “considered guilty of bloodshed” precisely because “he has shed blood.” In other words, he contemplated shedding blood in his heart, it was an intrinsic part of his thought and his nature, and he finally committed the very act he is accused of doing. He is not being legally labeled for something he did not do, or that was not in his nature, but for precisely for what he did do from his nature. This use of logizomai presents a fundamental problem for the Protestant theory of imputation since such a theory proposes that a man can be forensically declared righteous who has neither done a righteous act nor is righteous in his own nature. White then tries to support his theory by citing the use of the Hebrew equivalent of logizomai, the word bvj (chashab) used in Genesis 3:15. White states:

In Genesis 31:14-15, Rachel and Leah, Jacob’s wives, speak of their father and the treatment they have received at his hand. They say, “Do we still have any portion or inheritance in our father’s house? Are we not reckoned (hasav) [sic] by him as foreigners?” Of course, Rachel and Leah were not foreigners, but they were reckoned as such by their father.

White’s analysis is faulty on several counts. First, he again fails to quote the remainder of the passage in question. It reads, “Does he not regard us as foreigners? Not only has he sold us, but he has used up what was paid for us.” Rachel and Leah are speaking of their father Laban who took payment from Jacob as dowry for the right to have both Rachel and Leah as wives. Rachel and Leah recognize that Laban had actually “sold” them to Jacob and subsequently squandered all the wealth leaving nothing for his daughters. It is to these actions that Rachel and Leah view themselves as “foreigners” in Laban’s eyes – precisely because Laban was treating them as one would treat a foreigner who had no rights and was subsequently cheated out of money. Practically speaking, they were foreigners in Laban’s eyes. He treated them the same as foreigners, upon which they decided to take back what they determined he stole from them. After taking Laban’s possessions, they left with their husband Jacob for another land (Gn 31:16-21). We can apply the same principle to other issues of life. For example, if a wife commits adultery against he husband and he subsequently calls her a “whore,” it is not because she necessarily has caroused in the streets enticing men to her rented apartment. The wife is a “whore” because she has acted, at least in one instance, as a whore would act – she fornicated with another man. She has not only acted like a whore but has exhibited, to whatever degree, the intrinsic qualities of a whore. Similarly, Rachel and Leah were treated as “foreigners” by their father because of the financial position in which he put them, were upon they disowned him and terminated the familial bonds. Although they were still connected by blood ties, they cut themselves off from Laban and made themselves “foreigners” to him and even went to live in a foreign land. Again, they considered themselves foreigners because of the reality of being treated as foreigners, not because they thought Laban was just calling them names.

In addition to the above analysis we might also point out that White does not address the preponderance of instances in the LXX in which logizomai refers to the actual reality and existence of the thing or matter in view.[10] In fact, of the over one hundred times logizomai is used in the LXX it is rarely, if ever, used other than to actualize the reality of the matter or object it has in view.

In regards to imputation versus infusion, after citing Paul’s reference to David in Romans 4:6-8, White inquires:

Note the parallels that Paul presents: the imputation (reckoning) of righteousness and the non-imputation (“will not take into account”) of sin are likened to forgiveness of those sins, and to their “covering.” Where is the subjective change taught by Roman Catholic theology? It does not find support in the Scriptures because it doesn’t exist there.[11]

We hope that the information already supplied in this chapter will help in seeing where Scripture teaches justification by infusion. But in respect of White’s specific reference to David, let us investigate more thoroughly how Scripture explicitly portrays the concept of infusion. First, we can begin by citing the entire verse of Ps 32:1. David declares: “Blessed is he whose transgressions are forgiven, whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man whose sin the Lord does not count against him and in whose spirit is no deceit.” Notice that in connection to being “forgiven,” “covered,” and “sin...not counted against him,” David speaks of one “in whose spirit is no deceit.” This statement is speaking of the inner quality — the spiritual essence — of the person as he is being forgiven. His spirit has no deceit. It is not merely a legal covering given to David but a restoration or recognition of his inner nature. Lest we be confused about this additional dimension to David’s justification, he reiterates these same terms even more vividly in the companion passage of Psalm 51, a passage which is concerned with the same sin of David. In Ps 51:9-12, David writes of himself:

Hide your face from my sins and blot out all my iniquity. Create in me a pure heart, O God, and renew a steadfast spirit within me. Do not cast me from your presence or take your Holy Spirit from me. Restore to me the joy of your salvation and grant me a willing spirit to sustain me.

As we learned in chapter 4, Paul is using David’s experience in Psalm 32 and its companion passage of Psalm 51 as the reference point and definition for justification. In other words, what happened to David in Psalms 32 and 51 is what happens when one is justified. His sins are blotted out, but in addition, David speaks of his inner nature being changed. He wants God to create a “pure heart” and “renew a steadfast spirit” within him. He asks that God not take his “Holy Spirit” from him and desires that God will grant a “willing spirit” to sustain him. What clearer language could there be to describe the subjective change of the one whose sins are blotted out and covered? Similarly, statements such as “Wash away all my iniquity and cleanse me from my sin” in Ps 51:2 and “Surely you desire truth in the inward parts; you teach me wisdom in the innermost place” in Ps 51:6 show the convergence of God’s mindful forgiving of sin at the same time that he changes the inner essence of the person he forgives. The two events are simultaneous and it is Paul who is combining the simultaneity under the exclusive term justification in Rm 4:5-8, not the Protestant notion of sanctification.

[1] The Greek word logivzomai is transliterated logizomai.

[2] Lexicons by BAGD, pp. 475-476; Liddell and Scott, abridged version, p. 416.

[3] Joel Beeke, Justification by Faith Alone, p. 56.

[4] Lk 22:37; Rm 3:28; 6:11; 9:8; 1Co 4:1; 13:5, 11; Ph 3:13; 4:8; Hb 11:19, et al.

[5] Rm 2:26; 2Co 12:6.

[6] Alister McGrath in Iustitia Dei. See Appendix 2 for a refutation of McGrath’s thesis.

[7] Hodge, Justification by Faith Alone, p. 48.

[8] The Roman Catholic Controversy, p. 154.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Lv 27:23; Dt 2:11, 20; 3:13; 2Sm 4:2; 14:13, 14; 19:19, 43; 1Kg 10:21; 2Ch 5:6; 9:20; Jb 31:28; 34:37; Ps 34:4, et al.

[11] The Roman Catholic Controversy, pp. 154-155.

Dear Dr. Sungenis,

I was reading both your book Not By Faith Alone and a response that you wrote on your web site to Michael Horton.  In both your book and your web article you criticize both Horton and R.C. Sproul for stating that condign merit is the same as strict merit and thus imposes a legal obligation.  You make a distinction between condign merit and strict merit, equating condign merit with congruent merit.  I must confess that I am both confused by the concept of merit in this sense (this is not my question, I will read more and hopefully understand better afterwards) and am confused by the varied use of these terms (my real reason for writing).  I have included 2 catholic web pages that discuss merit and which give a view different than what I understand you to be saying.  Could you clear this up for me?  Is the problem that various people (even learned theologians) are using different terms for the same concepts or am I reading something wrong here?

Thanks,

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10202b.htm

Ethics and theology clearly distinguish two kinds of merit:

• Condign merit or merit in the strict sense of the word (meritum adœquatum sive de condigno), and
• congruous or quasi-merit (meritum inadœquatum sive de congruo).

Condign merit supposes an equality between service and return; it is measured by commutative justice (justitia commutativa), and thus gives a real claim to a reward. Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the lack of intrinsic proportion between the service and the recompense, claims a reward only on the ground of equity.

http://home.comcast.net/~icuweb/c01612.htm

“To understand merit, then, one must understand exactly which is meant by the term in theology because it is an analogous term. Merit is a kind of reward and normally it means something given in strict equivalence to someone for something he has done according to the virtue of justice. A contractor builds a house and merits a certain payment based on the contract and the work performed. If the one who contracted the work does not pay, then he is guilty of injustice. This is called condign merit, which is merit in strict equality. This is the normal experience of human reward in human affairs.”

 Jim and Kay Panaggio

R. Sungenis: Jim and Kay, the answer is already in the Catholic encyclopedia article you cited above at New Advent. Let me reproduce it here and make a couple of comments to clear up your confusion. First, however, allow me to quote from Thomas Aquinas on this very issue. You can find this on page 628 of my book Not By Faith Alone:

Note the difference between meritum de condigno and that which is said to be merit in strict justice. Even though both bespeak some right to a reward, they do so in different ways. Merit in strict justice implies an absolute equality without any grace given to the person who merits. But merit de condigno involves an equality which arises from grace which has been given to the one meriting. (Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 114, a. 1, ad 3.)

Notice that Thomas is making a distinction between condign merit and merit in strict justice.

Now the article in the Catholic Encyclopedia

If, however, salutary acts can in virtue of the Divine justice give the right to an eternal reward, this is possible only because they themselves have their root in gratuitous grace, and consequently are of their very nature dependent ultimately on grace, as the Council of Trent emphatically declares (Sess. VI, cap. xvi, in Denzinger, 10th ed., Freiburg, 1908, n. 810): "the Lord . . . whose bounty towards all men is so great, that He will have the things, which are His own gifts, be their merits."

R. Sungenis: Notice that if one says he has a "right to an eternal reward" it is not a right in the strict sense, that is, as if God owes him the eternal reward because God is obligated to pay by contract, rather, it is "dependent ultimately on grace."

The Encyclopedia goes on:

Ethics and theology clearly distinguish two kinds of merit:

• Condign merit or merit in the strict sense of the word (meritum adœquatum sive de condigno), and
• congruous or quasi-merit (meritum inadœquatum sive de congruo).

R. Sungenis: This is not to be understood as if there are only two kinds of merit, but understood as being only two kinds of merit in "theology," that is, in Catholic doctrine. Catholic doctrine does not teach that we can receive anything from God by STRICT merit, and thus it is not a "theological" category.

The Encyclopedia continues:

Condign merit supposes an equality between service and return; it is measured by commutative justice (justitia commutativa), and thus gives a real claim to a reward. Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the lack of intrinsic proportion between the service and the recompense, claims a reward only on the ground of equity. This early-scholastic distinction and terminology, which is already recognized in concept and substance by the Fathers of the Church in their controversies with the Pelagians and Semipelagians, were again emphasized by Johann Eck, the famous adversary of Martin Luther (cf. Greying, "Joh. Eck als junger Gelehrter," Münster, 1906, pp. 153 sqq.). The essential difference between meritum de condigno and meritum de congruo is based on the fact that, besides those works which claim a remuneration under pain of violating strict justice (as in contracts between employer and employee, in buying and selling, etc.), there are also other meritorious works which at most are entitled to reward or honour for reasons of equity (ex œquitate) or mere distributive justice (ex iustitia distributiva), as in the case of gratuities and military decorations.

From an ethical point of view the difference practically amounts to this that, if the reward due to condign merit be withheld, there is a violation of right and justice and the consequent obligation in conscience to make restitution, while, in the case of congruous merit, to withhold the reward involves no violation of right and no obligation to restore, it being merely an offence against what is fitting or a matter of personal discrimination (acceptio personarum). Hence the reward of congruous merit always depends in great measure on the kindness and liberality of the giver, though not purely and simply on his good will.

R. Sungenis: So we see again that the encyclopedia makes the distinction between "strict justice" and "meritum de condigno." It understands the former as analogous to "contracts between employer and employee, in buying and selling," which is the same analogy St. Paul used in Romans 4:4 when he spoke about work being a matter of debt.

Still, condign merit does have some kind of claim attached to it, but it is a claim that can only be based on God's promise to reward not on a contract that binds God to pay the worker. I can claim, for example, that I have a right to heaven, but I make the claim only on the fact that God promised to give me heaven if I do what he requires. I cannot make the claim, however, by demanding that God pay me by contract, a contract devoid of God's personal promise but is only a legal agreement. Promise and law are two different things, as Paul argues in Romans 4:13. 

I hope that helps.

I know you are very busy. I hope to get through to you via this email.  A friend posed this site against you in re to the accusation of plagerism etc. Can you direct me to a page off your site to answer these falsehoods?  I've searched your site and could not find it.

thanks

Chuck

R. Sungenis: Chuck, thank you for bringing this to my attention. As for the charge of plagiarism, it is ludicrous. The guy who originally levied the charge has since apostasized and joined the Seventh Day Adventist church. His name is William Cork. His wife is Jewish and he saw me as a threat to the Jews when I was only trying to point out their errors so as to protect Catholics from their deception. So he organized a massive campaign against me beginning in 2002. In one of my essays on the Reflections on Covenant and Missions document that issued by Cardinal Keeler and Jewish rabbis in 2002, I had included some cutting and pasting from various articles about the Jews, the Talmud, Judaism, etc., that I saw on the Internet. I was then accused of plagiarism for this cutting and pasting. It was not plagiarism. Plagiarism is the unlawful stealing of the original work of the author, a work that the author did not get from other sources. The material I cut and pasted was already known and documented by many sources, and the source from which I took it had already admitted to getting it from other sources. Furthermore, I had never been accused of plagiarism either before or after Cork's charges, and all one need do is read my books to see that I have the most meticulous footnotes of any Catholic author on the market. Every fact I obtain from another source is religiously footnoted. So there simply is no paper trail for them to substantiate their charges.

In the bigger picture, you have to understand that these guys were seeking to destroy me for my outspokenness about the Jews. They wanted me off the Catholic map. They wanted to make it look like I was dishonest and that my scholarship couldn't be trusted, since it was attacking the Jews. I was one of the premier Catholic apologist before 2002, having had many shows on EWTN, having written two of the most popular Catholic books (Not By Faith Alone and Not By Scripture Alone), and having debated many Protestants and actually winning the debates. That all changed when I took on the Jewish issues, and the Geocentrism issues. I became a pariah. But I am in this game for the truth, not popularity. It has paid off in many ways. This past year the bishops of the United States voted to take out a heretical sentence from the 2006 United States Catholic Catechism for Adults. Page 131 had stated that the Mosiac covenant was still valid for the Jews. I was the only Catholic in the world to point out this error. I wrote to the Vatican and the US bishops two years prior. Finally, in June 2008, the bishops voted 231 to 14 to eliminate the sentence. This shows you what seeking only for truth will do. But it also shows me that no other Catholic apologist was willing to stick his neck out on this and many similar issues, mainly because they all fear reprisal from the Jews and their supporters. I am different than they are, and I have been viciously attacked because of it. But I am the one getting the results.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

God be with you both.

Robert Sungenis